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RELIGION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND POST-
SECULAR LEGAL THEORY
ZACHARY R. CALOt
The idea of human rights embodies the moral outlook and
aspirations of modernity. It is through the language of human
rights that political obligations are established and articulated,
and it is through the language of human rights that an account of
human nature and personhood is given meaning and form. The
language of human rights is our common moral vocabulary. As
Michael Perry writes, "the morality of human rights-that is, the
morality that grounds the law of human rights-has become the
dominant morality of our time; indeed, unlike any morality
before it, the morality of human rights has become a truly global
morality."' The idea of human rights, in this respect, embodies
more than simply a system of legal norms. It rather represents,
more elementally, a morality that aims to transcend all
particular commitments and to serve as the basis of a shared
moral order. The language of human rights, argues Upendra
Baxi, has become a discourse that seeks "to supplant all other
ethical languages."2
The idea of human rights, particularly the underlying idea of
human dignity, is replete with echoes of the sacred. The
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for
instance, opens with a reference to the "inherent dignity ... of all
I Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.A., The
Johns Hopkins University; M.A., The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., University of
Virginia School of Law; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. Candidate,
University of Virginia.
1 Michael J. Perry, Christianity and Human Rights, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW
237, 237 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008). This claim has not gone
unchallenged. William Twining, for one, has questioned the strong version of the
"claim that the language of human rights has become the dominant mode of public
moral discourse of the last fifty years, marginalising or replacing other moral
discourses." WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 173, 173 (2009).
2 UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 2006).
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members of the human family."' The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights similarly grounds "the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family" in "the
inherent dignity of the human person."4  It should not be a
surprise that human rights norms rest, in some sense, on the
sacredly tinged language of human dignity given the extent to
which religious traditions, particularly Christianity, fed the
development of human rights. John Witte summarizes this
linkage in characterizing the modem human rights movement as
"an attempt to harvest from the traditions of Christianity and
the Enlightenment the rudimentary elements of a new faith and
a new law that would unite a badly broken world."' A number of
other scholars have explored the various ways in which'
Christianity gave birth to the ideas that would ultimately find
expression in the modern human rights movement.6 There were
many intellectual sources that shaped the idea of human rights,
but none were more foundational than Christianity.' In fact, it is
doubtful that the universal claims of human rights could have
emerged without religious traditions and concepts. As
Archbishop Rowan Williams argues, "there is no guarantee that
a 'universalist' account of human dignity would ever have seemed
plausible or even have emerged with clarity" absent "certain
themes consistently and strongly emphasised by the 'Abrahamic'
faiths."' The modern discourse of human rights is best
understood as a historically contingent construct dependent on a
variety of religious themes deeply rooted in the western
tradition.'
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10 1948).
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., adopted Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
6 John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion, and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1996).
6 See, e.g., BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS 26-27 (1997);
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE 324-25 (2008).
' For a discussion of the religious and philosophical roots of human rights, see
Thorwald Lorenzen, Towards a Theology of Human Rights, 97 REV. & EXPOSITOR 49,
51 (2000).
1 Rowan Williams, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective,
10 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 262, 272-73 (2008).
9 John D'Arcy May proposes that
[hiuman rights language is undeniably Western, unable to conceal its
origins in the legal categories inherited from Greece and Rome. So
conceived, it is an abstract universal that is logically independent of the
[Vol. 85:495496
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The idea of human rights continues to feed off the inherited
moral capital of its religious roots. Yet, in spite of these
intellectual links with Christianity, human rights claims-at
least in many of their regnant expressions-are now often made
on the basis of a secular foundation. 0 Modernity's "invention
of an autonomous secular realm" created space for the
development of an account of human rights sealed off from any
necessary connectedness to religious concepts and categories." A
movement born of religious insights was recast into an
autonomous moral logic that claimed no dependency on that
outside itself. As Witte argues, Christian ideas "participated
actively as midwives in the birth of this modern rights
revolution" but were eventually eclipsed by secular modes of
reasoning that rejected the dependency of human rights claims
on religion. 12
Not only did human rights discourses cut themselves off
from any dependence on religion, the idea of human rights has
increasingly been defined as a moral tradition that stands over
and against religion. As William Twining notes, "[slince the
Enlightenment and Grotius, most Western theorising about
human rights has been avowedly or implicitly secular," such that
human rights might advance universal moral principles that
"transcend[] differences between religions."3 The emergence of
human rights as an autonomous secular morality reflected the
Enlightenment's attempt to subsume the particular into the
universal." As Kristin Deede Johnson writes, the modern liberal
tradition is rooted in the "belief that through the use of reason all
people can be unified around a body of common truths and
myths and doctrines in which the various religions seek to found the
unique worth of human nature. The concept of human rights, though at
home in the Western liberal context of individual autonomy and political
freedoms, is for this reason communicable to cultures that construct the
human differently.
John D'Arcy May, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Religious Pluralism:
Buddhist and Christian Perspectives, 26 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUD. 51, 56 (2006).
1o Williams notes that given its dependence on religious themes, "a defence of an
unqualified secular legal monopoly in terms of the need for a universalist doctrine of
human right or dignity is to misunderstand the circumstances in which that doctrine
emerged." Williams, supra note 8, at 273.
n John Milbank, The Gift of Ruling: Secularization and Political Authority, 85
NEW BLACKFRIARS 212, 221 (2004).
12 Witte, supra note 5, at 10.
13 TWINING, supra note 1, at 174.
4 See id.
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morals."15 These truths, in turn, constitute, "a comprehensive
philosophical doctrine" that replace the particularistic claims of
revealed theology.16  In fact, according to the widely parroted
historical narrative, the turn from theology to secularity was
occasioned by the need to overcome the violence of religious
disagreement, particularly that of the bloody Wars of Religion."
Secularism was an article of peace which, by replacing the
particularistic claims of religion with a universal logic, removed
the source of sectarian dissent and violence.1 8 The universal and
the secular were intimately connected aspects of a modern
project that identified religion as a threat to public life." Human
rights norms, by extension, became the public moral vocabulary
within this new moral order.2 0 By establishing human rights as
an autonomous and purportedly universal logic, the secular could
reign as the unrivaled story of the world.2 1
This secular approach to the construction of human rights
dominates the main currents of contemporary human rights
thought in the West, particularly within the academy and other
elite institutions.2 2 Jeremy Waldron summarizes this state of
affairs by writing that, "In the circles in which I move, it is not
infrequently asserted that secular morality, secular ethics,
15 KRISTEN DEEDE JOHNSON, THEOLOGY, POLITICAL THEORY, AND PLURALISM 2
(2007).
16 Id.
17 Jeffrey Stout offers a typical account of this process, writing that
"secularization was not primarily brought about by the triumph of a secularist
ideology" but rather by the "need to cope with religious plurality." JEFFREY STOUT,
DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 102 (2004). William Cavanaugh has offered an
interesting challenge to this narrative, arguing that the modern liberal state did not
emerge as a response to religion but rather that the very concept of "religion" was
created out of the aggrandizing impulses of the modern state. William T.
Cavanaugh, "A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House:" The Wars of Religion
and the Rise of the State, 11 MOD. THEOLOGY 397, 397 (1995).
1 Charles Mathewes argues that, "[the secularist strategy assumed that even
with religious values quarantined from public, people would share enough common
ground to adjudicate their differences without recourse to their 'deep' metaphysical
and religious convictions." CHARLES MATHEWES, A THEOLOGY OF PUBLIC LIFE 112
(2007). Kristin Deede Johnson similar states that "liberal invocations of tolerance
have their roots in a very distinct epistemology, which includes a belief that through
the use of reason all people can be unified around a body of common truths and
morals." JOHNSON, supra note 15.
1 See Milbank, supra note 11, at 212.
20 See Lorenzen, supra note 7, at 52.
21 See STOUT, supra note 17.
See Jeremy Waldron, The Injury Done By Christian Silence to Public Debate
over America's Use of Torture, 2 J.L., PHIL. & CULTURE 1, 3-4 (2008).
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secular conceptions of human rights, and secular jurisprudence
can all get by perfectly well on their own without any input from
religion."2 3 This perspective is widely echoed in the thought of
leading scholars and commentators. Louis Henkin, for one,
argues that "in its contemporary articulation, the human rights
ideology, aiming at universality ... has eschewed invoking any
theistic authority."24 Henkin concludes that, "Human rights are
not, and cannot be, grounded in religious conviction," which is
"conceptually imperialistic."2 Hilary Putnam similarly identifies
a fundamental tension between the particularistic claims of
religion and the universal secular aspirations of human rights.26
Is it not the case, Putnam argues, "that if any one of the major
faiths holds on to its triumphalist and supercessionist claims,
then indeed religion is part of the problem, and not part of the
solution."27 Religious particularity, in other words, threatens the
secular preserve and universal aspirations of liberal norms.28
Human rights are thus fundamentally at conflict with strong and
particularistic theological claims.29 Only a liberal religion that
relativises its truth claims might have a role within a human
rights system. To cite yet another instance of this line of
thinking, Michael Ignatieff argues for the need to move beyond
"foundational arguments" based on religious assertions in order
"to build support for human rights on the basis of what such
rights actually do for human beings. "30 "Human rights," Ignatieff
argues, "is the language through which individuals have created
a defense of their autonomy against the oppression of religion."3"
To seek a theological grounding for human rights undermines the
basic achievement of liberal modernity that established public
life as a secular preserve from the encroachments of religion.3 2
23 Id.
24 Louis Henkin, Religion, Religions, and Human Righth, 26 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 229, 230-31 (1998).
25 Id. at 238.
26 See HILARY PUTNAM, Monotheism and Humanism, in HUMANITY BEFORE
GOD: CONTEMPORARY FACES OF JEWISH, CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC ETHICS 19 (2006).
27 Id. at 22.
28 Id.
* See Henkin, supra note 24, at 231-32.
30 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 54 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 2001) (emphasis omitted).
31 Id. at 83.
32 See Henkin, supra note 24, at 238.
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Finally, this secular negation of religion is pushed to its logical
conclusion by proposing that the very project of seeking any
foundation for human rights norms, be it secular or religious, is
outmoded." It is better, Richard Rorty advises, to move beyond
all such concerns in order to begin the work of advancing a
human rights culture.34 Human rights become not a source of
critique but a mirror onto ourselves and our reigning values.
The current conversation about human rights is, of course,
highly diverse in many respects. The positions described above
are part of a polyphonic and often contested field of debate." In
fact, explicitly theological voices have also achieved currency in
recent years, as have explicitly religious organizations operating
within the human rights field." That said, the secular account of
human rights not only represents the regnant position within
human rights discourses but also, it would seem, the default
position within modernity. It should not be surprising that the
secular account of human rights represents the default position
in modernity because human rights reflect-and indeed were
born out of-modernity's efforts to strip the world of a sacred
story and advance what Charles Taylor terms the "progress of
disenchantment."38 Modernity is defined by "the breakup of both
the ancient and the medieval senses of a synthesis of God, self,
and cosmos." 9 At the heart of the modern project is thus what
Robert Jensen describes as "the attempt to live in a universal
" See Stacy Humes-Schulz, Limiting Sovereign Immunity in the Age of Human
Rights, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 105, 127-28 (2008).
34 See Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, http://
webl.uct.usm.maine.edu/-bcj/issues/three/rorty.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
36 For a helpful typology of current approaches to human rights thought see
TWINING, supra note 1, at 173-77.
36 The culture of the human rights movement has been profoundly impacted in
recent decades by the emergence of explicitly religious actors. For example, on the
contribution of evangelical Christians to the human rights movement, see Zachary
R. Calo, "The New Internationals": Human Rights and American Evangelicalism, in
IS THE GOOD BOOK GOOD ENOUGH 149, 150-51 (David Ryden ed., 2011).
3 See Zachary R. Calo, Pluralism, Secularism, and the European Court of
Human Rights, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 261, 271-72 (2010-2011).
3 CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 49 (2004).
3 David Tracy, Public Theology, Hope, and the Mass Media: Can the Muses Still




story without a universal storyteller."o In this modern moral
order, theology was replaced by an autonomous secular logic, and
the codes of religion were replaced by the morality of human
rights.4 1 The emergence of human rights not only involved a
borrowing from religion, but a supersessionist move against
religion.4 2 Human rights norms became an alternative theology
that advanced a totalizing account of the human person and the
person's place within the cosmos. 3 Theological claims were thus
not only excluded from the idea of human rights, but deemed
antithetical to their realization." Human rights became, in Elie
Weisel's phrase, the "secular religion" of the modern world.
In light of this genealogy, human rights can be seen to not
only reflect the impulses of modernity, but to embody the full
realization of its aims and ideals. How, then, ought theological
traditions relate to the idea of human rights? Is there
meaningful space for religion within a discourse that, in its main
currents, is defined against religion? There are different models
for thinking about the constructive relationship between religion
and secular human rights. The conversations are particularly
well-defined within Christian thought. One approach posits
religion as the necessary foundation of human rights.4 6 Rather
than rejecting the turn to human rights in modernity, this Article
argues that the secular tradition cannot sustain itself.4 Rowan
Williams, for instance, argues that, "[t]he uncomfortable truth is
that a purely secular account of human rights is always going to
40 Robert W. Jenson, How the World Lost Its Story, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1993, at
31, 33, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/09/002-how-the-world-
lost-its-story-13.
" See Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment
Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1913-15 (2009).
4 See Calo, supra note 37, at 272-73.
13 The totalizing character of human rights, rooted in their underlying logical
structure, is manifest in the tendency to reach into more and ever expanding
spheres of human life. See generally Richard Stith, If Dorothy Had Not Had Toto To
Pull Back the Wizard's Curtain: The Fabrication of Human Rights as a World
Religion, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 847 (2010).
" See Dohrman W. Byers, The Morality of Human Rights: A Secular Ground, 26
J.L. & RELIGION 1, 28-29 (2010-2011).
* Elie Wiesel, Remarks at Millenium Evening (Apr. 12, 1999), available at
http://www.pbs.org/eliewiesel/resources/millennium.html.
46 See Amos Prosser Davis, International Civil Religion: Respecting Religious
Diversity While Promoting Iaternational Cooperation, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 87, 88-89 (2011).
" See id. at 89.
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be problematic if it attempts to establish the language of rights
as a supreme and non-contestable governing concept in ethics."4
Nicholas Wolterstorff and Michael Perry, among others, have
recently offered influential arguments that variously develop the
claim that the idea of human rights is ultimately incoherent
apart from religious presuppositions.4 9 In essence, this line of
argument seeks to overturn "the standard secularist account of
autonomous human rights" by reasserting the claim that "the
foundations of human rights .. . are essentially theological."s0
Religion is neither incompatible with modernity nor should it
unqualifiedly embrace the secular world that modernity has
wrought.5 1  Religion is, rather, the foundation of human rights
and, for that matter, the liberal democratic order.5 2
A different line of argument exhibits greater skepticism of
the project of reconciling theology with human rights, for it views
the project as necessitating the fatal capitulation of theology to
an alien and foreign logic. The basic concern is that Christianity
and liberal human rights "present vastly different pictures" of
the human person.5 ' As such, there is a risk in any theological
project that allows these differences to be "occluded" so that
Christianity might be "included in the current conversation."5 4 It
is for this reason that the use of human rights language within
Catholic social thought, Paolo Carozza notes, "has sometimes
attracted criticism, especially by those who see in the language of
human rights an inevitable compromise ... with fundamentally
incompatible premises of secular society."55 The temptation to be
* Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Religious Faith and Human
Rights (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.
php/1161/archbishop-religious-faith-and-human-rights.
" See generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(2007); WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 6.
o Max L. Stackhouse, Why Human Rights Needs God: A Christian Perspective,
in DOES HUMAN RIGHTS NEED GOD? 25, 26, 30 (Elizabeth M. Bucar & Barbra
Barnett eds., 2005.) Stackhouse also offers the following turn of phrase to emphasize
his central claim: "I deny that it was Kant's immaculate conception of human dignity
that served as the root of human rights ideas, as a number of secularist advocates of
human rights have claimed. He was not in that way Immanuel." Id. at 29.
51 See id. at 26-30.
52 See id. at 27-30.
" Johnson, supra note 15, at 223-24.
54 Id.
" Paolo Carozza, Notre Dame Law School, The Catholic Intellectual Tradition
and Human Rights, Address at St. Michael's College (Mar. 7, 2005).
502 [Vol. 85:495
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relevant can induce the fatal capitulation of theology to an alien
and foreign logic. To define religion as the foundation of human
rights turns it into the handmaiden of liberalism and thus
subsumes religious insights to a language and category that is
fundamentally antithetical to religion."
These descriptions provide an extremely general survey that
necessarily fail to capture the full complexities of the debate. It
is nevertheless the case that the broad contours of the
conversation frequently center around the question of whether
religion ought to reject human rights or place religion in their
service. This Article, however, proposes a third way that aims to
both synthesize and move beyond these dominant strategies.
The idea proposed is that religion should neither reject nor
embrace but rather transform the idea of human rights by
entering into a constructive engagement with the logic and
categories of modernity.57 The language of human rights is the
dominant moral vocabulary of the day, and the ability of religious
traditions to participate in serious political discourse would be
undercut if human rights were to be rejected in toto. At the same
time, the task of religion is not to provide a metaphysical
superstructure that might sustain the modern tradition of
human rights. Rather, this Article proposes that theological
traditions should advance distinct and particularistic accounts of
human rights that challenge the hegemony of the secular
tradition. In one respect, this project can be understood as part
of the broader contest over the place of religion within liberal
politics. Even within the most secular societies there is still a
need, as one scholar puts it, to "grapple with faith
6 For a discussion of theological perspectives that "den[y] the legitimacy of the
secular," see Michael Horton, In Praise of Profanity: A Theological Defense of the
Secular, in EVANGELICALS AND EMPIRE 252, 253-54 (Bruce Ellis Benson & Peter
Goodwin Heltzel eds., 2008).
' The need to enter into the fundamental categories of modernity is emphasized
by Paul Weller, who writes that
in a world existing on the other side of the impact of a historical condition
known as modernity, the relationships between 'religion' and 'human
rights' can only be appropriately considered within the context of a critical
understanding of, and engagement with, the impact of another basic reality
that is signified by the terminology of the 'secular.'
Paul Weller, 'Human Rights,' 'Religion' and the 'Secular': Variant Configurations of
Religion(s), States(s) and Society(ies), in DOES GOD BELIEVE IN HUMAN RIGHTS? 147,
151 (Nazila Ghanea et aleds., 2007).
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communities."" The liberal secular polity, insofar as it promises
to citizens the right to "live out their own pursuit of what they
see as being the good life," must account for the meaning-making
role of religious traditions and create appropriate political space
for the cultivation of plural sources of meaning." Yet, as it
concerns human rights, the issue is not merely that of defining
boundary lines between - the secular state and religious
communities, but rather that of reconceptualizing the role of
religious communities in shaping the content of human rights.
The elemental challenge in advancing constructive thought about
the relationship between religion and human rights is thus
related to, but ultimately distinct from, the issue of pluralism
within legal liberalism. It demands cultivating pluralism not
only within law but within our approach to the construction of
legal meaning. In this respect, work in the area of human rights
is part of a larger project of defining the relationship between
normative theology and secular jurisprudence.
Before discussing the characteristics of this project, it is
important to establish the warrant for it. After all, this
methodology stands in fundamental tension with the underlying
premises of human rights norms, grounded as they are in the
secular foundations of modern legal thought.60 To open the idea
of human rights to theological reasoning is to open law to the
intrusions of religion. Such an enceavour would seem, at least on
its face, to undermine the foundational premise of the secular
legal order. As one scholar notes, "[t]he Western idea of a secular
basis for law and order stems from the Enlightenment and its
confrontation with the political dominance of religion."61 Human
rights, in this traditional formulation, not only function without
religion, but serve as a mechanism to define the political over
and against religion. Yet, the political and intellectual
foundations of this secular order appear increasingly imperiled,
occasioning the need to rethink the idea and the foundations of
human rights-particularly the relationship between religion
and human rights. The space, and indeed the need, to pursue a
58 ANTHONY BRADNEY, LAW AND FAITH IN A SCEPTICAL AGE 143 (2009).
59 Id.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
61 Margit Warburg, Globalization, Migration and the Two Types of Religious
Boundary: A European Perspective, in RELIGION, GLOBALIZATION, AND CULTURE 79,
96 (Peter Beyer & Lori Beaman eds., 2007).
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pluralist theological turn within human rights thought is, above
all, grounded in the limitations of the secular narrative upon
which the modern idea of human rights has been constructed.
Cracks have increasingly appeared in the edifice of secular
liberalism, as we enter what is now termed a post-secular age.62
As Rajeev Bhargava observes, "[olver the last three decades,
secular states, virtually everywhere, have come under strain."6 3
This strain, arising from both sociological and philosophical
sources, need not negate the possibility of speaking coherently
about human rights, but must occasion a rethinking of the terms
on which this conversation proceeds. Above all, this rethinking
should consider the role of religion in human rights, for into the
space opened by the declension of the secular have emerged a
plethora of new religious dynamics. While sociologists and social
theorists have written extensively about the features of post-
secularity, these developments have had little impact on law and
legal theory.
One expression of this post-secular condition has been a
global resurgence in religion, particularly in public life, that has
upended the expectation that modernity would be marked by the
ineluctable movement away from traditional religious belief and
practice towards a secular future." As Mark Lilla writes, "[a]
little more than two centuries ago we began to believe that the
West was on a one-way track toward modern secular democracy
and that other societies, once placed on that track, would
inevitably follow.""5 It is certainly true that unbelief of various
sorts has a place in the modem world that is unique within
human history. As Charles Taylor writes, "we have ... changed
from a condition in which belief was the default option, not just
for the naive but also for those who knew, considered, [and]
talked about atheism; to a condition in which for more and more
people unbelieving construals seem at first blush the only
plausible ones."66 To not believe is now a possibility and, as
62 On post-secularity, see generally ROMAND COLES, RETHINKING GENEROSITY
(1997).
6 Rajeev Bhargava, States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism,
HEDGEHOG REV., Fall 2010, at 8, 8, available at http://www.iase-culture.org/
HHRArchives/Fall20lO/Bhargava-1o.pdf.
64 For an account of these developments, see generally JOHN MICKLETHWAIT &
ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK (2009).
65 Mark Lilla, The Politics of God, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at MM28.
66 CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 12 (2007).
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Taylor observes, the only plausible one for many." Yet, even as
faith is now experienced in different and more contingent ways,
the "global revival of religion" has made it clear that faith is not
disappearing.68 Unbelief is more prevalent and possible, but the
deep secularization of Western Europe remains the exception
rather than the norm." Modernity has not precipitated a
unidirectional move away from religion." Religion continues to
thrive, even if in new forms that reflect the limits and
possibilities of the age. 7 ' An account of human rights that does
not incorporate this reality is both anthropologically and
sociologically corrupt, for it rests on an account of the world that
denies the continuing role of religion in shaping the meaning of
the human and the human in the community.
The post-secular condition refers not only to a resurgence of
religious faith and practice that might be measured on an
empirical basis, it also refers to a fragmentation in meaning that
undermines the universal aspirations of the secular. Post-
secularity must therefore be understood as involving what one
scholar has described as "detraditionalisation."7 2  With
detraditionalisation, the secular, as a concept that took a
particular shape in modernity, is destabilized and challenged.
Into this fragmented secular reality, religious traditions emerge
as alternative sources of political and moral meaning. Post-
secularity, in this respect, involves the negation of an
autonomous secular and the opening of the public to overlapping
67 See id.
6 See generally MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 64.
69 See id. at 185. On secularism in the United Kingdom and its implications for
law and politics, see generally BRADNEY, supra note 58. Bradney notes, for instance,
that "[slecularism runs through contemporary British society," and has produced a
skepticism about total truths. Id. at 16-17.
o See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 64, at 11-12.
7 See id.
72 Lieven Boeve, Europe in Crisis: A Question of Belief or Unbelief? Perspectives
from the Vatican, 23 MOD. THEOLOGY 205, 222 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Beoeve's description of detraditionalization, which is grounded in the
European context, refers not only to a decline in the secular, but also traditional
religious beliefs and practices. See id. at 222-23. Detraditionalization, as Boeve
reads it, refers to a process in which there is no longer any one dominant culture
force, religious or secular. See id.
" See id. at 222.
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and contested meanings.74  Within the secular public emerges
"space for multiple publics, overlapping yet each marked by its
own telos, doctrine, and practices."
This destabalization of secular meaning presents a
fundamental challenge to the legal and political order of
modernity. At the heart of the modern project was the
construction of law and politics as ontologically and spatially
separate from religion. What Jos6 Casanova terms the
"differentiation of the secular spheres" involved "the transfer of
persons, things, meanings, etc., from ecclesiastical or religious to
civil or lay use, possession or control."" The construction of
secular politics was thus not merely about jurisdictional matters
such as disestablishment, but equally about the source of deep
political meaning, for the "differentiation of the secular sphere[ ]"
severed law from any participation in divine economy and
emphasized the autonomous nature of its logic. 8 Law contains
its own reason that transcends and ultimately judges the
particularistic claims of theology.
To speak of post-secularity in this context is not to deny that
the order wrought by modernity continues to inform social and
political life. Legal systems in the West remain creations of this
fusion between liberalism and secularism.8 0 Post-secularity does
not then augur a return to the premodern fusion of the religious
and the political. It is not a rejection of modernity so much as a
development within modernity. All the same, this development
does mitigate against "the principles of Enlightenment and
secular democracy" by blurring "the boundary of the secular
versus the sacred."' As such, our inherited conception of the
secular, and of the political norms and institutions it has
generated, cannot remain stable. In particular, the post-secular
74 See JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 225.
7 Id.
76 See ROBERT CUMMINGS NEVILLE, RELIGION IN LATE MODERNITY 160-61
(2002).
7 Jos6 Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,
in RELIGION, GLOBALIZATION, AND CULTURE, supra note 61, at 101, 101.
78 JoSt CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 30 (1994).
79 See id.
8 See MILAN ZAFIROVSI, LIBERAL MODERNITY AND ITS ADVERSARIES 434
(2007).
1 Warburg, supra note 61, at 93.
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challenge to political meaning problematizes the idea of
universality upon which the idea of human rights has been
constructed.
Out of the constructed reality of secular modernity emerged
the language and law of human rights as an ordering morality."
Human rights became the morality of the liberal public while
religion was sequestered in the private. The idea of human
rights retained a "quasi-religious" character, but it rested on a
totalizing secular logic closed off to the religious." Human rights
norms were universal precisely because they made no recourse to
the particular, that is, the religious. Yet, the breakdown of the
strong secularization narrative has called into question "the
Enlightenment ideals of a purely secular basis for the law."8 It
certainly calls into question the viability and prudence of an
approach to law and politics premised on the creation of a purely
secular public. Part of the challenge for human rights thought is
therefore to wrestle with how the concept, born of these ideals of
Enlightenment and secular liberalism, might remain meaningful
in a context where the secular and the sacred are not so clearly
differentiated. What does it mean to speak of the universal when
the secular political basis for such a claim is under assault? The
post-secular challenge has profound consequences for law and
politics, for it raises questions about whether a unitary
description of the public might meaningfully account for, and do
justice to, the multiple publics that exist.
An initial step in assessing the meaning of human rights in a
post-secular context involves critiquing the purported neutrality
of secular logic. Universal secular logic is not neutral." As
Michael McConnell argues, "[a] genuinely pluralistic liberalism
must recognize that secularism is no more neutral than
religion."" Secularism, in other words, is not the mere absence of
82 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2007).
" See id.
* See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 53-96 (Amy Gutman ed., 2001).
8 See id. at 55-56.
8 Warburg, supra note 61.
87 Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith,
in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 23 (Michael W. McConnell et al.
eds., 2001).
8 Id. Lisa Cahill similarly argues that "no language about the concrete
conditions of human life enjoys such neutrality." See Lisa Sowle Cahill, Rights as
Religious or Secular: Why Not Both?, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 41, 46 (1999-2000).
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religion but is an ideology that advances a normative account of
the world. 9 It is an ideology, a way of thinking and encountering
the world, that aims to desacralize the meaning of politics.o
Secularism, Craig Calhoun proposes, "is not simply a creature of
treaties to end religious wars, the rise of science, or the
Enlightenment. It is informed by a long history of engagements
with the temporal world and purposes that imply no
transcendence of immanent conditions."9' The resultant liberal
tradition, William Connolly similarly argues, endorses "a self-
sufficient public realm" that "strains metaphysics out of politics"
and "insists upon the sanctity of an authoritative line of division
between religion in private life and public political discourse."9
Secular neutrality must therefore be identified as committing a
certain form of violence against religious citizens. For many, it
might be understood as a necessary and justified form of
violence, but it cannot be maintained that secular logic is
anything but a constructed account of reality competing for
normative superiority. Post-secular conditions have drawn into
the open that which the mythology of modernity had hidden.93
Moving forward, the challenge is to determine what it would
mean to develop an account of law and legal thought that moves
beyond the universal contours of secularism.
One of the most thoughtful and significant reflections on
questions of law, religion, and universality came recently when
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams delivered a
controversial address regarding civil and religious law in
England.94 In discussing the subject of "supplementa[1]
jurisdiction," Williams advanced the claim that "legal
universalism [is] a negative thing."9 5 On one level, this comment
was intended to critique a theory of law that rejects a priori the
possibility of there being space for religious law, particularly
9 See McConnell, supra note 87.
9o See id.
91 Craig Calhoun, Rethinking Secularism, HEDGEHOG REV., Fall 2010, at 35, 35,
available at http://www.iasc-culture.org/HHR Archives/Fall2010/Calhounlo.pdf.
92 WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, WHY I AM NOT A SECULARIST 21-22 (1999).
9 Lorenzo Zucca's comments are revealing. He argues that, "[tihe concept of
constitutional secularism has shaky theoretical foundations." Lorenzo Zucca, The
Crisis of the Secular State-A Reply to Professor Saj6, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 494, 509
(2009). "Religion," he adds, "is not the prime problem of the secular state" and "may
even help the state" establish a better foundation. Id.
94 See generally Williams, supra note 8.
9 Id. at 270-71.
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Sharia law, within the civil law." Yet, we might also understand
Williams's critique of legal universalism in a broader
jurisprudential context. Williams is doing more than putting
supplemental jurisdiction on the table. In fact, to focus on this
aspect of the argument is to miss the larger and more explosive
jurisprudential project at work. The critique of legal
universalism is rather part of a broader challenge to the
"unqualified secular legal monopoly" that defines human rights
talk." What is needed as an alternative, Williams proposes, is
the development of a "theology of law" that might reconceptualize
the normative relationship between law and religion within the
context of late modernity.9" The issue of supplemental
jurisdiction, which has generated increased debate in recent
years, must be located within the more foundational issue of how
the positive law relates to other systems of moral order.
Williams's intervention in the debate about supplemental
jurisdiction provides a roadmap for assessing the relationship of
religion to the idea and law of human rights. The defining
characteristic of this project is the shifting of focus from the
universal to the particular. Rather than articulating an account
of human rights on neutral universal terms, it does so on the
basis of particularistic normative worldviews, including religious
traditions. It thus replaces a universal logic with a theological
logic and invites communities of religious meaning to participate
in discourse concerning human rights and human goods without
starting from a secular premise. This task is fundamentally
anthropological in its focus, for at the heart of secular legal
I In discussing "supplementa] jurisdiction," Williams is considering whether
Islamic law courts ought have jurisdiction in certain areas, such as family law or
inheritance. See id. at 268-69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
9' Id. at 273. Williams, it should be emphasized, was only attacking a certain
kind of universalism. The claim that "legal universalism [is] a negative thing"
should not be understood as attacking the notion that there ought be universally
binding legal norms. Id. at 271. The target of Williams's critique was not
universalism, as such, but rather a certain account of universalism that doggedly
admits of no space for the opening of law, and politics more generally, to the
multiplicity of sources of meaning and identity that shape our lives. See id. at 273.
" Id. at 272.
" This work might be pursued fruitfully within different theological traditions,
though the Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity and Islam will likely be places
of particular creativity and possibility given their theological resources and location
at the center of these conversations. For an example of this work within the




universalism is an artificial human being divorced from the
particular sources of human meaning.100 As John Milbank
writes, the liberal tradition required the invention of
a wholly artificial human being who has never really
existed .... This is the pure individual, thought of in
abstraction from his or her gender, birth, associations, beliefs
and also, crucially, . . . from the religious or philosophical beliefs
of the observer of this individual as to whether he is a creature
made by God, or only material, or naturally evolved and so
forth.10
This artificial person is the starting point from which the
universal claims of human rights are established.102 However,
the rejection of pluralism that necessarily undergirds this
anthropology not only advances an abstract and contentless
account of the human person, but also grants to secular
government, in Williams's words, "a monopoly in terms of
defining public and political identity."10 3 Rather than subsuming
particularity under a totalizing universal secular logic, this
project proposes a theological turn that opens human rights to
distinct and contingent accounts of personhood.10 4
While there is a risk in opening public life to such intrusions
of particularity, only by so doing can human rights be grounded
in genuine respect, understanding, and dialogue. As Charles
Mathewes argues, "Modern thought in general . .. is ill-
equipped" to advance such encounters because it is committed
"more to avoiding than to confronting the challenge" of
otherness. 05  Genuine personhood is hidden behind the
abstractions of liberal anthropology. 0 6  Yet, to regard another
person as a bearer of dignity and rights requires confronting that
person in her distinctiveness and particularity, a task which the
modern secular project undercuts and avoids.0 ' Pluralism is
100 See Milbank, supra note 11, at 213.
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 Williams, supra note 8, at 265.
" See id. at 266 ("[Tlhere is a risk of assuming that 'mainstream' jurisprudence
should ... bypass the variety of ways in which actions are ... understood by agents
in the light of the diverse sorts of communal belonging in which they are involved.").
105 Charles T. Mathewes, Pluralism, Otherness, and the Augustinian Tradition,
14 MOD. THEOLOGY 83, 84 (1998).
10 See id. at 92-93.
1o7 See Scott Cummings, Affirmative Action and the Rhetoric of Individual
Rights: Reclaiming Liberalism as a "Color-Conscious" Theory, 13 HARV.
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thus not antithetical to human rights, as the universalist
strategy proposes,os but arguably a precondition for genuinely
encountering the other as an equal bearer of dignity. In this
respect, pluralism ought not to be viewed as a threat to universal
moral norms, but rather as the basis for sustaining a genuine
human rights culture. 0 s The modern project, premised as it is on
a depersonalized universal logic, is a frail and unstable creation
that cannot organize a strong human rights order."o It destroys
the human even as it endeavors to affirm her."' As Javier
Martinez writes, "secular reason cannot found a real sociality or
a true humanity."1 2 True sociality, which ought to be the basis
for a culture of human rights, can only be found in respecting and
acknowledging the true humanness of the human person.113
The breakdown of the secular and the universal-the twin
hallmarks of modernity and its human rights progeny-makes it
permissible, perhaps inevitable, that theological concerns will
explicitly engage debates about the meaning and content of
human rights. However, even as this breakdown opens secular
human rights to theological critique, this process should not be
understood as inaugurating a theological contest against
modernity. The injection of theological particularity challenges
the truncated secular logic of modernity but does not seek to
overcome modernity.114 Indeed, accepting the idea and language
BLACKLETTER L.J. 183, 190 (1997) (discussing the "conflict thesis," in which a liberal
state's individual rights are at odds with, for example, racial distinctiveness).
108 NEGOTIATING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (Lynda S. Bell et al. eds.,
2001).
*1 Pluralism can serve to deny the meaningfulness of particular claims as much
as it can recognize others in their particularity. Pope Benedict XVI, for instance, has
written about "a peculiar Western self-hatred that is nothing short of pathological."
Jean Bethke Elshtain, While Europe Slept, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2009, at 33, 35-36
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus pluralism, just like universalism,
might equally be a tool of evasion rather than engagement.
no Stephen A. Hansen, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 223, 226 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H.
Weston eds., 2006).
n1 Id.
us Javier Martinez, Archbishop of Granada, Beyond Secular Reason: Some
Contemporary Challenges for the Life and the Thought of the Church, as Seen from
the West, Remarks at the Conference Organized by Russia Cristiana on Orthodox
Theology and the West in the Twentieth Century (Oct. 2004), available at
httpd//www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5205F.pdf.
" See Milbank, supra note 11, at 235 (describing the "futile circle" caused by
reliance on liberalism as the source of human rights).
n1 See Williams, supra note 48.
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of human rights as a starting point for reflection is to tie
theological engagement to this modern inheritance and to accept
in some measure its legitimacy. 1 5  It is an act of what Rowan
Williams terms "[s]alvaging" because "the language of rights is
indeed the only generally intelligible way in modern political
ethics of decisively challenging the positive authority of the state
to do what it pleases."1
The task of opening human rights to theology is not
supersessionist. It is dialogical and ultimately corrective. The
task might be understood as a critical yet constructive
engagement over the nature of the human person, human
freedom, and human flourishing. Theological traditions hold
distinctive perspectives on the meaning of the human that should
be at the center of contests over the meaning and content of
human rights norms. There will certainly be matters of
agreement between secular and theological traditions, a fact that
should not be surprising given the ways in which modernity's
account of the person draws from religious traditions, even as it
seeks to mask this inheritance behind claims of universality.
Yet, this task will also reveal significant points of conflict
between religious traditions but, even more importantly, between
religious and secular traditions. If, as one scholar has proposed,
the fundamental dividing line in modernity is "not that between
different religious cultures, but that between the radical
emancipation of man from God, from the roots of life, on the one
hand, and the great religious cultures, on the other," then this




117 Boeve, supra note 72, at 213. Many religious commentators have made just
this point. The Islamic legal scholar Mohamaad Kamali has written of the
"differences between the theistic view of right and freedom when compared to what
they mean in a secular context," MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI'AH LAW 206
(2008), while Jewish legal scholar David Novak has pointed to the "great
difference . . . between religious members of a democracy and its secularist members,
especially in the ways they affirm human rights and even in the way they determine
what some of these rights are." DAVID NOVAK, IN DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
106 (2009). For a discussion of tensions between liberal and Catholic accounts of
human rights, see generally Zachary R. Calo, Catholic Social Thought, Political




These differences need not be fatal to the work of advancing
a human rights culture and even achieving a meaningful
consensus.118 The tension between religious and secular accounts
of human rights takes places within the bounds of modernity. It
is a debate about the moral life of modernity and, more
specifically, the role of religion within the public and political life
of the modern world. The problem for religious thought is thus
not the secular, as such, but rather a secularism that promotes
what Pope Benedict describes as the "total separation" of religion
and politics.1 9 The problem for religion is not the liberal
tradition writ large, but a certain account of liberalism that
presents itself as being what McConnell calls a "comprehensive
ideology"-a totalizing and self-contained story of the world that
admits of no space for religion.1 20 While it is commonplace to
think of the secular as a creation of modernity, the secular is in
fact the creation of the long history of western Christendom. 12 1
The secular, in its older formulation, was not an ideology but
rather a jurisdictional concept concerning the relation of the
ecclesial and the political-the sacred and the profane.122 Going
even further, one might posit that the secular is a creation of
Christian theology, particularly creational and incarnational
theology.'2 3 Robert Markus has, along these lines, proposed that,
"[t]he idea of the secular is present within the Christian tradition
from the start," and was given a particularly significant
expression in the thought of Saint Augustine.124 More recently,
11 Lisa Cahill notes that, "[slince most or all historical societies are internally
pluralistic, public discourse need not and indeed cannot be purely and intransigently
'secular.'. .. Commonality and particularity are not mutually exclusive." Cahill,
supra note 88, at 45-46.
119 Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Participants in the 56th National Study
Congress Organized by the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists (Dec. 9,
2006), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict xvilspeeches/2006/
december/documents/hf ben xvispe_20061209._giuristi-cattolici-en.html.
120 McConnell, supra note 87, at 19.
121 See generally id.
122 See generally id.
12' See ROBERT A. MARKUS, CHRISTIANITY AND THE SECULAR 13 (2006).
124 Id. See generally R. A. MARKUS, SAECULUm: HISTORY AND SOCIETY IN THE
THEOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE (1988).
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Pope Benedict has sought to recover the tradition of Christian
"secularity" for constructive social and political thought.'2 5 In
short, secularism does not have a univocal meaning but rather
expresses itself in multiple contingent forms, all of which relate
to religion in different ways.
As such, opening the idea of human rights to theological
perspectives invites a contest over the meaning of liberal
modernity. It is a contest within modernity over the meaning of
modernity. Theology might identify much in the modern order
that can be affirmed, while also rejecting modernity's
disenchantment-its closing off to transcendence that followed
what Charles Taylor terms the "Great Disembedding" of moral
order and cosmic creed.1 26 We should therefore reject any simple
dualism between theology and secular modernity and instead
identify the existence of multiple modernities.'2 7 The
Enlightenment account of human rights is but one historically
contingent tradition among many, not the tradition to end
tradition. The secular liberal tradition represents the dominant
account of modernity, but this need not be the end of the story,
for theology might give birth to alternative modernities that
neither reject secularity entirely nor capitulate to the dictates of
its Enlightenment formulation.
Out of these different modernities will emerge different
understandings of the foundations, content, and possibilities of
human rights discourses and politics. The theological turn thus
takes the modern construct of human rights as a starting point
while offering theology as a corrective to the dominant logic
undergirding it. The challenge is to cultivate, within the modern
moral order-a moral order responsible for universalizing the
claims of human rights-a new modernity that might contain a
true and full account of the human. This task, then, does not
125 As an alternative to dogmatic secularism, Benedict has developed the idea of
"'healthy secularity,' " Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 119, which can be understood
most basically as "[a] secularity including God." To Catholic Lay Jurists, Eternal
Word Television Network, http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/bl6layjurists.
HTM (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). On healthy secularity applied to the area of human
rights, see generally Zachary R. Calo, Human Rights and Healthy Secularity, 7 J.
CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 231 (2010).
126 TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 65--66.
127 See generally GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ROADS TO MODERNITY: THE BRITISH,
FRENCH AND AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENTS (2004).
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seek to overcome the language of human rights but rather to
enchant modernity's claims about the nature of human
personality and freedom by embedding them within an
alternative moral drama. This project does not represent a
capitulation to the alien secularity of modernity, but an attempt
to reclaim the human person hijacked by modernity.
Human rights provide a particularly fruitful case study for
examining the relationship between theology and legal theory.
Human rights not only maintain a dominant role within the legal
and political discourse of the modem world but, because the idea
of human rights embodies the full aspirations of the modern
project, it draws us into conversation about the moral life and
ambitions of modernity.'2 8 As with human rights, the
constructive development of religious legal theory must take as
its starting point the captivity of legal theory to the secular
norms of modernity, particularly the idea of law as grounded in
an autonomous moral logic. Echoing a theme that has animated
the argument in this Article, Mark Modak-Truran argues that
"the modern paradigm can not likely maintain the autonomy of
law from political, moral and religious convictions."129 The
resultant dissolution of legal autonomy creates within legal
thought, just as it has within human rights, space for a turn
towards theological particularity. 3 0 However, much of the work
seeking to integrate law and theology, particularly among
Christian thinkers, has failed to seize the opening provided.' 3 1
Most of this constructive work remains too tepid in its approach
to integration and too modest in its ambitions. David Skeel, for
instance, has identified four main areas in which Christian legal
scholarship has taken place-natural law, Christian lawyering,
First Amendment and church-state issues, and Christian legal
history.132 What is common, albeit in different ways, in all of
12 See Perry, supra note 1, at 237-38.
129 Mark C. Modak-Truran, Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part I): Toward
a New Paradigm for Law and Religion, 27 MISS. C. L. REv. 159, 196 (2007).
130 See id.
131 See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal




these areas is that Christianity serves a largely adjectival
function with respect to law, leaving the resources of theology at
the fringes of legal meaning. Law and religion scholarship has
failed to question the fundamental premises of the
conversation-the inherited idea of law born of secularity
modernity-just as it has often failed to integrate the inherited
idea of human rights.
This tepidness reflects the continuing boundedness of law
and religion scholarship to the logic of a certain mode of secular
modernity-a logic that birthed the very concept of "religion," as
if all the particularities of theological traditions could be
subsumed within a universal genus. A more constructive
approach would involve religious legal theory shifting the locus of
its activity from law and religion to theological jurisprudence. 3 3
This would position religious legal thought to escape the captivity
of modern logic and begin interrogating the deeper assumptions
informing legal scholarship. It is, after all, not simply work in
law and religion that remains captive to this modern logic. This
is a problem afflicting law more generally. Much of modern legal
thought remains wed to a belief in the idea of "law."'34 We
continue to talk of law as if it refers to an objective ontological
reality, a tendency that belies the deeper skepticism of the
modern condition. This is the same problem confronting human
rights talk. As Michael Perry observes, the idea of human rights
"is, for many, the hardest of the great moral ideas [of the
twentieth century] to integrate, the hardest to square, with the
reigning intellectual assumptions of the age."'35 In particular,
Perry highlights the incongruity between the strong moral claims
of human rights and the reigning idea that "there is no God or
metaphysical order of any kind."13 6 It is, after all, peculiar that
the idea of universal human rights emerged as the dominant
political morality at the same historical moment when confidence
in a stable and ordered universe crumbled. 1 3  This condition,
" Rowan Williams references the need for "more reflection ... about the
theology of law." Williams, supra note 8, at 272.
" See id. at 270.
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which Stephen Smith labels law's "ontological gap," poses a
fundamental challenge to legal thought in modernity, and it is a
challenge that ought be at the center of constructive reflection
about the relationship of law and theology."
This ontological gap might be an occasion of despair in that
it highlights the mythological architecture undergirding the legal
enterprise. 3 9 But, it also might be an opportunity to reimagine
the meaning and foundations of law. For religious legal theory,
the response to this ontological gap should be neither to ignore it
nor to attempt to close it with recourse to a new foundationalism.
Rather, it ought to enter into this gap, seeing it as a space for
religious ontologies to participate in the process of legal meaning-
making. As Mark Modak-Truran argues, "[tihe different theories
of law under the modern paradigm all attempt to preserve the
autonomy of law so that law has a secular foundation."o The
modern project of a universal, secular, autonomous legal
enterprise, however, has failed. 141 The failure, or at least the
devolution of this project, is met by some with trepidation, for it
imperils that which Mark Lilla describes as the "Great
Separation" of theology and politics that defined the emergence of
liberal modernity. 4 2  "The revival of political theology in the
modern West is a humbling story," Lilla writes.143 "It is an age-
old habit of mind that can be reacquired by anyone who begins
looking to the divine nexus of God, man and world to reveal the
legitimate political order."14 4 There is certainly a risk in opening
modernity to the theological, and many remain wed to the belief
that the achievements of modernity are incompatible with strong
theological claims. But perhaps it is the case that only by moving
beyond the Great Separation that certain basic insights of
'3 STEPHEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 155-56 (2004).
139 See id. at 155.
uo Modak-Truran, supra note 129, at 201.
141 See id.





modernity can be presdrved. The central task for religious legal
theory, both as concerns human rights as well as jurisprudence
more generally, is to explore this transformative possibility.1 4 5
'4 Although I lack the space to develop this theme, this mode of critique is not
unidirectional. It is, rather, best understood as dialogical in its methods. The critical
encounter between theological and secular modes of reason has the capacity to shape
modes of religious thought and must therefore be pursued with a certain modesty.
As Charles Taylor argues, it took the dethroning of established religion-in this case
Christianity-to discover within its own moral resources ideas and ideals long
ignored. See A CATHOLIC MODERNITY? 13, 13-14 (James L. Heft ed. 1999). Rowan
Williams makes a similar claim to Taylor in proposing that "the Enlightenment was
a necessary wake-up call to religion." Williams, supra note 8, at 273. The theological
turn in human rights inaugurates a process of mutual critique and correction that
occurs both between religion and secular traditions as well as among different faith
traditions. The constructive potential of modernity's critique might be seen, for
instance, in Catholic wrestling with the issue of religious freedom during much of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Developments within Islam might augur
similar possibilities. See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE
SECULAR STATE (2008).
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